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International human rights norms and the South African
choice on termination of pregnancy act: an argument for
vigilance and modernisation
Lucıa Berro Pizzarossaa and Ebenezer Durojayeb
aDepartment of Transboundary Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Groningen, The
Netherlands; bFaculty of Law, Dullah Omar Institute, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town,
South Africa
ABSTRACT
The right to access abortion services as an integral component of
the right to sexual and reproductive health (SRH) has been
increasingly recognised in the field of international human rights
law. However, much more progress is necessary to realise this
right in practice. The work of the United Nations human rights
bodies and more recently the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights has been instrumental in signalling the import-
ance of the legal framework and in setting clear guidelines to
steer countries into reforming national laws in order to comply
with their international obligations. This article explores the extent
to which the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy and the
amendment Bill submitted by the African Christian Democratic
Party comply with International Human Rights Norms. Our ana-
lysis reveals that (i) the South African state has fallen short in
adopting a legal framework that complies with the International
Human Rights Norms and (ii) the proposed bill would constitute
a retrogressive measure and its adoption would violate the state’s
obligations under international human rights law. In sum, this art-
icle makes an argument for the modernisation of the South
African abortion law and for careful vigilance of the proposed
legislative amendments.
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South Africa stands out in the region for its robust rights framework on abortion and
has been globally praised for the substantive protection given to reproductive rights in
its 1996 Constitution, and its Choice on Termination of Pregnancy (CTOPA) Act, 92
of 1996. Albertyn notes that the latter transformed the legal framework for abortion
from limited access, defined by race and class and policed by medical necessity and the
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criminal law, to a rights-based framework that allows for abortion on request.1 While
the Act undoubtedly represents a step in the right direction, 22 years have passed and
it demands a closer look in light of the most recent human rights standards.
Removing the barriers to access to abortion services is a crucial step towards the ful-
filment of the right to sexual and reproductive health.2 The first step in that direction
is – as Gruskin points out – their ‘identification’ and ‘careful analysis’ in order to pro-
ceed to their ‘subsequent modification through laws, policies and regulations that are
consonant with human rights’.3 Accordingly, a critical analysis of the South African
legal framework in light of human rights standards is essential for the further reform
and advancement of this right in practice. This article will use a framework4 based on
international human rights law – especially the recent General Comment No. 22 (GC
22) and the General Comments of the African Commission – to discuss the aforemen-
tioned Act and amendment Bill and whether the requirements contained therein form
barriers to women’s access to reproductive health services, violating their basic rights.5
It will start with a brief overview of the international SRH framework so as to set the
stage for the ensuing analysis of the South African CTOPA.
This article aims to contribute to the South African debate on access to termination of
pregnancy services by critically assessing to what extent the CTOPA complies with the
international obligations assumed by the state. Furthermore, it intends to provide a human-
rights based analysis of the Bill proposed by the African Christian Democratic Party.
2. Human rights standards and legal barriers to access abortion services
2.1 International standards
In 1994, the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) trans-
formed the existing discourse on reproductive health and rights from a strategy to meet
demographic targets and control population growth to a more comprehensive and posi-
tive approach to sexuality and reproduction.6 Although the final conference documents
failed to demand universal access to abortion services, the ICPD nonetheless stated that
‘in circumstances where abortion is not against the law, such abortion should be safe’.7
The ICPD recognised, in addition, that it is the responsibility of governments to legislate
1 C Albertyn ‘Claiming and Defending Abortion Rights in South Africa’ (2015) 22 Revista Direito GV 430.
2 S Gruskin, J Cottingham, AM Hilber, et al. ‘Using human rights to improve maternal and neonatal health: History,
connections and a proposed practical approach’ (2008) Bulletin of the World Health Organization 591.
3 Ibid.
4 The framework of analysis used here was developed by Berro Pizzarossa and used to assess the Uruguayan Law
on Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy in L Berro Pizzarossa ‘Legal barriers to access abortion services through
a human rights lens: the Uruguayan experience (2018) Reproductive Health Matters 26(52) 1422664.
5 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment No. 22, Right to Sexual and
Reproductive Health’ (2016) UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/22.
6 See generally A Garita ‘Moving toward sexual and reproductive justice: A transnational and multigenerational
feminist remix,’ in R Baksh and W Harcourt (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Transnational Feminist Movements
(2014). UN International Conference on Population and Development. 1994a. Programme of Action of the
International Conference on Population and Development. A/CONF.171/13. http://www.policyproject.com/matrix/
Documents/Cairo.html
7 M Berer ‘The Cairo “compromise” on abortion and its consequences for making abortion safe and legal,’ in
L Reichenbach and M J Roseman (eds), Reproductive health and human rights: The way forward (2009) 152; see
also UN International Conference on Population and Development, ‘Programme of Action’ (1994) para 8.25.
Emphasis added.
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the matter and, when doing so, translate international commitments into national laws
and policies.8 The CEDAW Committee affirmed that States parties should also remove
punitive measures for women who undergo abortion.9
In March 2016, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights adopted
a groundbreaking GC 22 on SRH, aiming to assist State parties with the implementation
of their international obligations.10 GC 22 affirms that the right to sexual and reproduct-
ive health is an integral part of the right to health that has enjoyed longstanding recogni-
tion based on already existing international human rights instruments.11 Furthermore,
GC 22 contains four key components: it (a) adopts a life-cycle approach, therefore not
reducing sexual and reproductive health to ‘maternal health’, (b) recognises that sexual
and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) are indivisible from and interdependent
with other human rights, (c) rejects all forms of coercive practices in SRHR and (d) rec-
ognises the particularly gendered experiences in SRHR, stating that due to women’s
reproductive capacities, the realisation of women’s right to sexual and reproductive
health is essential to the realisation of the full range of their human rights.12
From very early on UN bodies, such as the CEDAW Committee, have recognised
that legal arrangements are key to realising SRHR and have cautioned countries of the
harmful impact of ‘inadequate’ laws.13 For example, in one of its concluding observa-
tions to Namibia, the Committee notes how the ‘inadequacy of the existing law on
abortion contributed to the problem’ of high rates of maternal mortality due to unsafe
abortions being carried out.14 For that reason, the UN bodies have recommended
states to be proactive in the adoption of a legal framework on SRHR, recommending
countries to adopt laws and policies to guarantee the exercise of SRHR.15 Importantly,
the Lancet Commission on Women and Health emphasises the need for ‘an
enabling social, legal, and regulatory environment’ to respond to women’s and
girls’ health needs and rights.16 The Commission on the Status of Women, likewise,
continues to demand that states strengthen their normative, legal, and policy
8 J Cottingham, E Kismodi, AM Hilber, et al ‘Using human rights for sexual and reproductive health: Improving legal
and regulatory frameworks’ (2010) Bulletin of the World Health Organization (2010) 551.
9 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ‘Statement of the on Sexual and
Reproductive Health and Rights: Beyond 2014 ICPD Review’ (2014) UN Doc. CEDAW/C/2014/I/CRP.
10 UN CESCR ‘General Comment No. 22’ (note 5 above).
11 The General Comment refers to General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health
(Art. 12 of the Covenant) (2000) § 2, 8, 11, 16, 21, 23, 34 and 36. GC22 the following documents as examples:
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), article 12; Convention on
the Rights of the Child (1989), articles 17, 23–25 and 27; and Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (2006), Articles 23 and 25; See also the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) General Recommendation No. 24: Women and Health (1999), paras 11, 14, 18, 23, 26, 29, 31(b);
and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General Comment No. 15: The right of the child to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health (2013).
12 L Berro Pizzarossa ‘Legal barriers to access abortion services through a human rights lens: the Uruguayan
experience (2018) Reproductive Health Matters 26(52), p.1422664.
13 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ‘Report of the 20th and 21st Session’ (1999)
UN Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1 para. 228. Berro Pizzarossa (note 4 above).
14 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ‘Report of the 16th and 17th Session’ (1997)
UN Doc. A/52/38/Rev.1, para 111.
15 See eg UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ‘Concluding Observations on the Fifth
Periodic Report of Azerbaijan’ (2015) UN Doc. CEDAW/C/AZE/CO/5 (2015) para 33.
16 A Langer, A Meleis, FM Knaul, et al ‘Women and health: The key for sustainable development,’ (2015) The
Lancet 1178.
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frameworks.17 In this regards, GC 22 affirms that states have an obligation to adopt
‘appropriate legislative’ measures in order to achieve the full realisation of SRHR.18
GC 22 determines that states have an obligation to repeal or eliminate laws, policies,
and practices that criminalise, obstruct, or undermine individual’s or particular groups’
access to SRH facilities, services, goods, and information. This is considered to be
a ‘core obligation’—one that is deemed two-fold in this analysis.19
2.1.1 Obligation to reform laws that impede the exercise of the right to SRH and
immediate obligation to eliminate discrimination
On one hand, GC 22 affirms that states are under an ‘immediate obligation’ to elimin-
ate discrimination against individuals and groups, and to guarantee their equal right to
SRH.20 The GC outlines that the realisation of women’s rights and gender equality
requires states to repeal or reform any discriminatory laws, policies, and practices in
this area. The CEDAW Committee has also previously recommended taking steps
toward the decriminalisation of abortion, requiring countries to modify or repeal the
existing abortion legislation in line with obligations assumed internationally.21
The former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Anand Grover, has argued
that laws criminalising abortion ‘infringe women’s dignity and autonomy by severely
restricting decision-making by women in respect of their sexual and reproductive
health’.22 Grover states that ‘[c]riminal laws penalising and restricting induced abortion
are the paradigmatic examples of impermissible barriers to the realisation of women’s
right to health and must be eliminated’.23 In the same line, GC 22 lists laws that crim-
inalise or restrict abortion as examples of laws that must be repealed by states.24
2.1.2 Obligation to remove and refrain from enacting laws and policies that cre-
ate barriers in access to SRH services
On the other hand, states are required to remove and refrain from enacting laws and
policies that create barriers in access to sexual and reproductive health services.25 GC
22 explicitly addresses states’ obligation to remove all barriers interfering with women’s
access to reproductive health services.26
17 UN Commission on the Status of Women ‘Report of the 60th Session’ (2016) UN Doc. E/2016/27-E/CN.6/2016/
22 11–5.
18 Ibid paras 33 and 45.
19 CESCR, General Comment No. 22 (note 5 above), para 49(a).
20 Ibid para 34.
21 See eg UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ‘Report of 15th Session’ (1996) UN
Doc. A/51/38 para. 131; UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ‘Concluding
Observations on the Combined Eighth and Ninth Periodic Reports of Haiti’ (2016) UN Doc. CEDAW/C/HTI/CO/8-9
para 33; UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Report of the 13th Session’ (1994)
UN Doc. A/49/38 para 492; UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ‘Report of the
37th Session’ (2007) UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SUR/CO/3 para 30; UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women ‘Concluding Observations on the Combined Initial to Fifth Periodic Reports of Seychelles’ (2013)
UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SYC/CO/1-5 para. 35(c); CESCR ‘General Comment No. 22’ (note 5 above) para 28.
22 UNCHR Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health (A Grover) ‘Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur’ (2011) UN Doc. A/66/254
para 21.
23 Ibid paras 14–6.
24 Ibid paras 28, 34, 40, and 49(a)(e).
25 CESCR ‘General Comment No. 22’ (note 5 above) para 40.
26 Ibid para 28.
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Concretely, in relation to the tripartite typology in human rights, GC 22 establishes
that the duty to respect requires states to refrain from interfering with individuals’ right
to exercise their sexual or reproductive health. Examples include limiting or denying
access to health services and information, such as laws or practices that require third-
party authorisation for access to abortion or contraception, among others.27 Under the
obligation to protect, states must protect individuals’ right to SRH from interference by
third parties, such as private health clinics, or insurance companies that impose prac-
tical or procedural barriers to health services.28 The obligation to fulfil, requires states
to take measures to eradicate practical barriers to the full realisation of the right to
SRH, such as disproportionate costs and lack of physical or geographical access to sex-
ual and reproductive health care.29
Liberalizing abortion laws undoubtedly represents a step forward, but as the GC 22
affirms all barriers must be removed, including legal barriers. As noted in L.C. v. Peru
by the CEDAW Committee, countries should establish an appropriate legal framework
that allows women to exercise their right to access abortion services.30 The Committee
built on the considerations made by the European Court of Human Rights that read
‘[o]nce the legislature decides to allow abortion, it must not structure its legal frame-
work in a way which would limit real possibilities to obtain it’.31
Furthermore, the UN Human Rights Committee notes: ‘in cases where abortion pro-
cedures may lawfully be performed, all obstacles to obtaining them should be remov-
ed”.32 For example, the latter has also called upon Argentina ‘to eliminate all
procedural barriers that would lead women to resort to illegal abortions that could put
their lives and health at risk’.33 Moreover, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has
indicated that the denial of legally available health services – such as abortion and
post-abortion care – can cause tremendous and lasting physical and emotional suffer-
ing that can amount to torture or ill-treatment.34 The UN bodies also set guiding
standards for the future, asking states to ensure no unduly burdensome restrictions to
abortion services are adopted.35
Evidence from the ground continues to confirm that restrictive abortion laws are
proven to be associated with a high incidence of unsafe abortions and the consequen-
tial negative health outcomes.36 Abortions in these restrictive settings contribute
significantly to maternal mortality rates and preventable deaths worldwide.37
27 Ibid paras 40–1.
28 Ibid paras 42–3.
29 Ibid para 46.
30 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ‘Communication No. 22/2009’ (2011) UN Doc.
CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009 para 8.17. Emphasis added.
31 Ibid.
32 UN Human Rights Committee ‘Concluding Observations on Argentina’ (2000) UN Doc. CCPR/CO/70/ARG; UN
Human Rights Committee ‘Concluding Observations on The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (2015) UN
Doc. CCPR/C/MKD/CO/3 para 11.
33 Ibid.
34 UNCHR Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (JE
Mendez) Report of the Special Rapporteur (2011) UN Doc. A/HRC/22/53.
35 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ‘Concluding Observations on the Combined
Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports of Spain’ (2015) UN Doc. CEDAW/C/ESP/CO/7-8 para. 31.
36 L Ashford, G Sedgh, and S Singh ‘Making abortion services accessible in the wake of legal reforms’ (2012) Issues
in Brief 1–4.
37 Ibid.
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The decriminalisation of abortion and the elimination of barriers in access thereto are
therefore also crucial to ensure compliance with other core obligations set forth by GC:
the obligation to prevent unsafe abortions.38
2.2 Regional standards
In the regional setting, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) is the first human rights
instrument in the world to explicitly set forth the reproductive rights of women to
medical abortion. Art 14(2)(c) of the Protocol recognises the right to medical abortion
when pregnancy results from sexual assault, rape or incest, or when the continuation
of a pregnancy endangers the health or life of the mother, or when there is danger to
the life of the foetus.39
This right is two-fold and represents the approach to SRHR promoted by women
from the South. On one hand, the Protocol adopts the classic approach to abortion
that subsumes it into negative rights – such as privacy in the US context. In this inter-
pretation, the right to abortion prohibits the state from interfering with the woman’s
decision to have a safe abortion in the permitted circumstances. On the other hand, the
Protocol innovates by understanding that abortion entails a positive obligation of the
state to take steps to fulfil the realisation of the right. In this line, Article 26 of the
Protocol enjoins states parties to adopt all necessary measures, including budgetary
measures, to fulfil the rights guaranteed by the Protocol. State obligations arising from
article 14(2)(c) require implementation at the state level – not just in terms of merely
recognising the grounds for abortion, but also establishing the infrastructure, including
the dissemination of health information and provision of healthcare services for the
termination of pregnancy under safe conditions.40
In clarifying states’ obligations under article 14(2)(c) of the Maputo Protocol, the
African Commission in General Comment 2 (GC 2)41 explains the relevance of equality
and non-discrimination to sexual and reproductive health and rights of women. In line
with WHO’s definition, GC 2 defines ‘health’ holistically to include physical and men-
tal well-being.42 It premises the right to contraception/family planning and abortion on
the state obligation to ensure access to reproductive health services that are available,
accessible, ethically and culturally acceptable, and of good quality.43 It calls on states
to adopt purposive interpretation of grounds for abortion similar to the WHO
38 UN Committee CEDAW 16th-17th Session (note 13 above) para. 49(e). L Berro Pizzarossa ‘Legal barriers to access
abortion services through a human rights lens: the Uruguayan experience (2018) Reproductive Health Matters
26(52) 1422664.
39 C Ngwena and E Durojaye, ‘Strengthening the Protection of Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in the
African Region through Human Rights: An Introduction’, Strengthening the protection of sexual and reproductive
health and rights in the African region through human rights (2014) 334.
40 Center for Reproductive Rights Briefing Paper: Reproductive Rights Violations a Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment: A Critical Human Rights Analysis (2010) <http://reproductiverights.org/sites/
crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/TCIDT.pdf>.
41 African Commission ‘General Comment No. 2 on Article 14.1 (a), (b), (c) and (f) and Article 14. 2 (a) and (c) of the
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa’ (adopted in the
55th Ordinary Session in Luanda, Angola 28 April–12 May 2014).
42 Ibid para 7.
43 Ibid para 28.
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Technical Guidance.44 Further, it notes that where the risk to ‘mental health’ is relied
upon, it is not necessary to first establish psychiatric evidence. The GC requires States
to ensure access to health services on a non-discriminatory basis and in ways that are
physically and economically accessible, and in which information is accessible.45
Echoing the UN standards on states’ obligations to realise rights, GC 2 explains that
the duty to respect rights requires State parties to refrain from hindering, directly or
indirectly, women’s rights and to ensure that women are duly informed on family plan-
ning/contraception and safe abortion services.46 The duty to protect requires State par-
ties to take the necessary measures to prevent third parties from interfering with the
enjoyment of women’s sexual and reproductive rights. It particularly cautions on
the use of conscientious objection to hinder access to abortion services for women.
47The GC further explains that the duty to promote imposes obligation on states par-
ties to create legal, economic and social conditions that enable women to exercise their
sexual and reproductive rights with regard to family planning/contraception and safe
abortion, as well as to enjoy them. Regarding the duty to fulfil, it requires that States
Parties adopt relevant laws, policies and programmes that ensure the fulfilment de jure
and de facto of women’s sexual and reproductive rights, including the allocation of suf-
ficient and available resources for the full realisation of those rights.48
Ngwena et al have noted that GC’s 2 ‘human rights value goes beyond providing
states with guidance for framing their domestic laws, practices, and policies to comply
with treaty obligations’ but is also ‘invaluable in educating all stakeholders-including
healthcare providers, lawyers, policymakers, and judicial officers at the domestic level-
about pertinent jurisprudence’.49
3. The South African legal framework
Cook et al note that ‘[n]o society, no religion, no culture and no system of national law
has been neutral about issues of human reproduction’.50 Indeed, SRH—including
access to safe and legal abortion services—are intimately connected with issues of gen-
der justice and dignity.51 The developments in South Africa are no exception to this
rule. This section will outline the country’s legal framework on the topic.
The country has ratified all the relevant international human rights instruments that
ground sexual and reproductive health as human rights, including the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the CEDAW, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and has signed and committed to implement
both the ICPD and Beijing Platform for Action. South Africa is also a party to the
44 Ibid para 30.
45 Ibid para 31.
46 Ibid para 42.
47 Ibid para 43.
48 Ibid para 44.
49 C Ngwena, E Brookman-Amissah & P Skuster ‘Human rights advances in women’s reproductive health in Africa’
(2015) 129 International Journal of Gynaecology and Obstetrics 184.
50 RJ Cook, BM Dickens, and MF Fathalla, Reproductive health and human rights: Integrating medicine, ethics, and law
(2004) 3.
51 RB Siegel, ‘Sex equality arguments for reproductive rights : Their critical basis and evolving constitutional
expression,’ (2007) 56/4 Emory Law Journal 819.
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African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.
Reproductive rights are warranted constitutional provision in the South African
regime. The Bill of Rights mentions reproductive rights in two different sections.
Section 12(2)(a) states that, ‘Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integ-
rity, which includes the right [… ] to make decisions concerning reproduction,’ and
section 27(1)(a) states ‘Everyone has the right to have access to [… ] health care serv-
ices, including reproductive health care.’
Two years after achieving democracy, South Africa passed the Choice on
Termination of Pregnancy Act, 92 of 1996. The law provides for abortion on request
within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. After the 12th week up to and including the
20th week the law requires the consultation with one medical practitioner that needs to
certify that (i) the continued pregnancy would pose a risk of injury to the woman’s
physical or mental health; or (ii) there exists a substantial risk that the foetus would
suffer from a severe physical or mental abnormality; or (iii) the pregnancy resulted
from rape or incest; or (iv) the continued pregnancy would significantly affect the
social or economic circumstances of the woman.52 After the 20th week the procedure
requires the consultation with two medical practitioners (or one medical practitioner
and a registered midwife) that must be of the opinion that the continued pregnancy (i)
would endanger the woman’s life; (ii) would result in a severe malformation of the foe-
tus; or (iii) would pose a risk of injury to the foetus.53 There are limitations in terms of
medical personnel authorised to provide abortion services and medical facilities in
which such services can be provided. The CTOPA does not require a mandatory wait-
ing period. The CTOPA does not remove all criminal penalties. Section 10 of the Act
lists a number of offences relevant to ‘[a]ny person’ who does not comply with the pro-
visions of the Act when providing an abortion.
The passing of the CTOPA placed South Africa as a champion for SRHR in the region.
The law granted access to safe and legal abortion managing to substantially reduce mater-
nal mortality and morbidity by 91 per cent in the first years of implementation.54
However, more than twenty years have passed and the enthusiasm for the trans-
formative potential of the CTOPA has faded. Albertyn points at the deep problems of
implementation in South Africa characterised by state inaction (eg failure to provide
information, designate and staff clinics, procure drugs) and an absence of formal rules
(eg no Guidelines or Protocols in place), as well as powerful and oppositional informal
rules and practices (especially around stigma, moral judgments and conscientious
objection).55 For the period 2011–2013 the Sixth Confidential Enquiries into Maternal
Deaths in South Africa indicated an alarming rate of illegal abortions and the South
52 See section 2 (1) of the Act.
53 See section 2 (2) of the Act.
54 R Jewkes, H Brown, K Dickson-Tetteh, J Levin and HRees ‘Prevalence of morbidity associated with abortion before
and after legalisation in South Africa’ (2002) 324 British Medical Journal 1252–3; R Jewkes, H Brown, K Dickson-
Tetteh, J Levin ‘The impact of age on the epidemiology of incomplete abortions in South Africa after legislative
change’ (2005) 122 International Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 355–9.
55 C Albertyn ‘Rights, Equality, Freedom and Reproductive Justice’ Paper prepared for conference: Beyond Human
Rights: Rethinking Gender Equality In Law And Politics 2017, University de los Andes Bogota, Colombia.
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African government has identified ‘septic abortion’ as one of the most common causes
of death among women.56
The CTOPA has stood many challenges both at the judicial and legislative level. The
latest challenge was a Bill proposed by Ms C Dudley from the African Christian
Democratic Party on the 6 of December 2017. The Bill – was considered by the
National Assembly and proposed a series of amendments to the CTOPA. In summary
the proposed changes were related to (a) the participation of additional professionals
in the abortion process (a social worker must also participate), (b) the elimination of
the possibility to seek an abortion if it would pose a risk of injury to the foetus (c) the
provision of mandatory counselling for women seeking abortion and (d) the new
requirement of an ultrasound examinations and to repeal the Choice on Termination
of Pregnancy Amendment Act, 2004 that provided – among other things – that mid-
wives could terminate pregnancies up to the 12th week.57
3.1 Legal barriers to access abortion services in the South African law
While the South African legal framework on SRH and abortion signified an important
step towards the realisation of the right to access abortion services, a closer look reveals
a number of burdensome requirements that must be fulfilled in order to access these
services. This section will analyse some of the requisites set by the South African cur-
rent CTOPA in light of the human rights standards discussed in Section 2.
Besides the general obligations delineated above, the UN system has grappled with
an extensive list of specific barriers and have provided clear guidelines to assist coun-
tries in enacting/modifying/repealing national laws so as to comply with their inter-
national obligations regarding SRH. This section will briefly describe the requirements
set out in the South African CTOPA, which one needs to meet in order to lawfully
access abortion services, and will assess those requirements in light of human rights
standards. Moreover, it will analyse the draft bill filed by African Christian Democratic
Party and requirements they proposed to introduce.
South Africa is not the only jurisdiction that reports difficulties in translating the
legal norms into effective access to service. For example, evidence from Canada con-
cluded that access to abortion services remained ‘practically illusory’ in 2007 due to
restrictive practices and policies, even though it has been legally permissible
since 1988.58
In general, the World Health Organization (WHO) observes that laws, policies, and
practices that restrict access to abortion services can deter women from seeking care
and create a ‘chilling effect’ for the provision of safe, legal services.59 These restrictions
not only violate the obligations to eradicate barriers as we saw in Section 2, limiting
56 National Committee for Confidential Enquiries into Maternal Deaths ‘Saving Mothers 2011–2013: Sixth Report on
Confidential Enquiries into Maternal Deaths in South Africa: short report’ <http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/mcwh/
Maternal/Saving-Mothers-2011-2013-short-report.pdf>; Office on the Status of Women ‘South Africa’s National
Policy Framework for Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality’ http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.
detail?p_lang¼en&p_isn¼94056&p_country¼ZAF&p_count¼1051&p_classification¼05&p_classcount¼38.
57 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Bill (B34-2017) <https://pmg.org.za/bill/748/>.
58 J Downie and C Nassar ‘Barriers to access to abortion through a legal lens’ (2007) 15/977 Health Law Journal 143.
59 World Health Organization Safe abortion: Technical and policy guidance for health systems (2012) 95.
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women’s access to lawful services, but also result in inequities in access and
create disproportionate risks for black, poor, young women and other women in vul-
nerable positions. These women often do not have the resources—time, money, trans-
portation means—and knowledge to face all the obstacles required by law.60
Moreover, these barriers make access unduly burdensome for women who
experience gender-based violence or sexual violations, and who are twice more likely to
need abortion services than women who do not experience such violence.61 The next
subsections will assess four specific requirements and the issue of obstruction to
access posed by ‘conscientious objection’ in light of the abovementioned human
rights standards.
3.1.1 Counselling and access to unbiased information
The ICPD states that reproductive health care includes access to information, education,
and counselling on human sexuality, family planning, and responsible parenthood.62
Likewise, General Comment 14 has framed the right to information on SRH as an essen-
tial component of the right to health.63 Moreover, GC 22 refers to the Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education and iterates that the realisation of SRHR
necessitates States parties to meet their obligations under other provisions of the
Covenant, such as the right to accurate and scientific information.64 Equally, GC 2 of the
African Commission emphasises the need for states to ‘ensure provision of comprehen-
sive information and education on human sexuality, reproduction and sexual and repro-
ductive rights’.65 Also, General Comment 1 of the African Commission urges states to
‘guarantee information and education on sex, sexuality, HIV, sexual and reproductive
rights, which must be evidence-based, facts-based, rights-based, non-judgemental and
understandable in content and language’.66 It further requires ‘States to provide access to
information and education, which should address all taboos and misconceptions relating
to sexual and reproductive health issues, deconstruct men and women’s roles in society,
and challenge conventional notions of masculinity and femininity’.67
The CTOPA states that ‘The State shall promote the provision of non-mandatory
and non-directive counselling, before and after the termination of a pregnancy’
(Section 4). However, the Regulations Under The Choice On Termination Of
Pregnancy Act, 1996 state that the medical personnel involved are legally mandated to
inform the women seeking abortions of (a) the available alternatives to the termination
of her pregnancy (ii) the procedure and the associated risks of the termination of her
60 See C Fiala and J Arthur ‘Dishonourable disobedience’ - Why refusal to treat in reproductive healthcare is not
conscientious objection’ (2014) Psychosomatic Gynaecology and Obstetrics 16.
61 See World Health Organization Violence against women: A ‘global health problem of epidemic proportions’ (2013).
62 ‘Programme of Action’ (note 6 above) para 7.6.
63 UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment No. 14, The Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health’ (2000) UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 para 11.
64 UNHRC Special Rapporteur on the right to education (V Munoz) ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur’ (2010) UN Doc.
A/65/162; see also CESCR ‘General Comment No. 22’ (note 5 above) para 21.
65 African Commission ‘General Comment No. 2’ (note 45 above) para 32.
66 See African Commission ‘General Comments on Article 14 (1) (d) and (e) of the Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa’ (adopted during the 52nd Ordinary Session in
Yamousoukuro, Cote de’lvoire 9–22 October 2012) para 26.
67 Ibid.
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pregnancy.68 The Regulations seem to override the provisions of the CTOPA going
beyond what is legally mandated by providing for a sort of mandatory counselling on
these aspects as the doctors are obliged to provide certain information (and
omit other).
The Regulations require that women – additionally to giving their informed consent
– are informed of the ‘associated risks’ of the termination of pregnancy. This has two
major implications. Firstly, the CTOPA and more notably the Regulations present
abortion – in contrast to the continuation of the pregnancy – as an exceptional and
unhealthy procedure. Hence, while the decision to continue with pregnancy is con-
strued as normal, natural, and unproblematic in the South African framework, the
decision to terminate the pregnancy cannot be entrusted to women and requires the
most careful thought – meriting not only the provision of informed consent but also
this expanded advice/counselling instance.69 Sheldon notes that modern medicine has
shifted fundamentally away from ‘doctor knows best’ paternalism: today patients are
routinely trusted, and indeed expected, to make medical decisions for themselves.70
Pregnant women are not an exception to this fundamental legal principle except when
the issue at hand is the termination of that pregnancy.
Secondly, undoubtedly, all individuals have the right to receive relevant, accurate
and unbiased information prior to obtaining medical care so they can make sound
decisions regarding treatment. The first point does not mean to indicate that those
women are not entitled to receive ‘evidence-based, facts-based, rights-based’ informa-
tion on any medical procedure they decide to undergo. However, abortion is a safe and
legal medical procedure that does not require expanded counselling. The critique here
lies in the legally mandated preference for maternity that requires medical personnel to
inform the health consequences of the abortion procedure but not those that triggered
by the continuation of pregnancy. This limitation on the information that doctors are
legally obliged to provide – showing preference for one option over the other – neglects
science-based information that evidences legally induced abortion to be markedly safer
than childbirth.71 In fact, childbirth-related death is 14 times more likely than death
resulting from abortion.72 Thus, this legally mandated preference for pregnancy viola-
tes states’ obligation to respect and protect SRH, including the obligation to refrain
from withholding information or providing inaccurate figures.73 In practice, this over-
emphasis of abortion-related risks may unduly influence women’s decisions. In the
words of Rebecca Cook, ‘the role of health professionals is to give the individual deci-
sion-maker medical and other health-related information that contributes to the indi-
vidual’s power of choice and does not distort or unbalance that power’.74
68 Regulations Under the Choice On Termination Of Pregnancy Act, 1996 <https://srhr.org/abortion-policies/
documents/countries/02-South-Africa-Choice-of-Termination-of-Pregnancy-Act-Regulation-168-1997.pdf >.
69 M Boyle Re-thinking abortion : Psychology, gender, power and the law (1997) 29.
70 S Sheldon ‘The Decriminalisation of Abortion: An Argument for Modernisation’ (2015) 610 Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies <http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/doi/10.1093/ojls/gqv026>.
71 See EG Raymond and DA Grimes, ‘The comparative safety of legal induced abortion and childbirth in the United
States’ (2012) 119/6 Obstetrics & Gynecology 1271–2.
72 Ibid.
73 CEDAW Committee ‘20th–21st Session’ (note 13 above) paras 56 and 58.
74 R J Cook, ‘International human rights to improve women’s health’ in R J Cook, Women’s health and human
rights: The promotion and protection of women’s health through international human rights law (Geneva: World
Health Organization, 1994) 26.
60 L. BERRO PIZZAROSSA AND E. DUROJAYE
Moreover, the Draft Bill proposed by the African Christian Democratic Party intro-
duces the requisite of mandatory counselling and intends to amend the CTOPA in this
direction. This requirement can be critiqued on two grounds. Firstly, scientific evidence
indicates that (a) pre-termination counselling is not wanted or needed by the majority
of women because they are already certain of their decision and (b) policies aimed at
mandatory pre-termination counselling would be a waste of resources and contrary to
women’ s wishes. Indeed, 84 per cent of women interviewed in a study conducted in
the UK said they did not need counselling because they were already sure of their deci-
sion. 75 In fact, there is extensive research indicating that most women make a decision
on the outcome of unintended pregnancy at the time of taking a pregnancy test or
even before taking a pregnancy test.76 Secondly, international human rights standards
demand elimination of this type of requirement. The CEDAW Committee, for
example, has repeatedly denounced laws that provide for mandatory counselling
and considers them as impermissible attempts to ‘restricting women’s access to
abortion’.77 The Committee has insisted in its recommendations that such
requirements should be repealed.78 As an example, the Committee urged Hungary to
ensure access to safe abortion without subjecting women to mandatory counselling
and a medically unnecessary waiting period as recommended by the World
Health Organization.79
The WHO follows a similar line considering that ‘[p]roviding information and offer-
ing counselling can be very important in helping the woman consider her options and
ensuring that she can make a decision that is free from pressure’. The WHO recognises
that many women have made a decision to have an abortion before seeking care, and
explains clearly that ‘this decision should be respected without subjecting a woman to
mandatory counselling’. In the 2012 publication titled Safe Abortion: Technical and
Policy Guidance for Health Systems the recommendation given by the WHO leaves no
room for doubt’ [p]rovision of counselling to women who desire it should be volun-
tary, confidential, non-directive and by a trained person’.80
3.1.2 Barriers in terms of authorised medical professionals and facilities
The CTOPA requires the ‘consultation’ of medical professionals for cases of women
seeking abortion services after the 12th week of pregnancy. Within the 13th week and
up to the 20th week the abortion service can only be provided if a medical practitioner
is of the opinion that any of the four circumstances provided in Section 2 (1) (b) of the
75 C Baron, S Cameron, A Johnstone ‘Do women seeking termination of pregnancy need pre-abortion counselling?’
(2015) 41/3 Journal of Family Plannning and Reproductive Health Care 181–5.
76 S Rowlands ‘The decision to opt for abortion’ (2008) 34 Journal of Family Plannning and Reproductive Health Care
175–180; S Brown ‘Is counselling necessary? Making the decision to have an abortion. A qualitative interview
study’ (2013) 18 European Journal of Contraception and Reproduction 44–48; CL Cohan, C Dunkel-Schetter, J Lydon
‘Pregnancy decision making: Predictors of early stress and adjustment’ (1993) 17 Psychology of Women
Quarterly 223–239.
77 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ‘Concluding observations on the eighth
periodic report of the Russian Federation’ (2015) UN Doc CEDAW/C/RUS/CO/8 para 35; ‘Concluding observations
on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Slovakia’ (2015) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SVK/CO/5-6.
78 Ibid ‘Concluding observations on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Slovakia’ para 31.
79 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ‘Concluding observations on the combined
seventh and eighth periodic reports of Hungary’ (2013) UN Doc CEDAW/C/HUN/CO/7-8 para 30.
80 World Health Organization (note 64 above).
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CTOPA are present.81 From 20 weeks of gestation onwards, abortions are available
under limited circumstances. In this last case, two medical practitioners or a medical
practitioner and a registered midwife need to be of the opinion that continued preg-
nancy would endanger the woman’s life, pose a risk of injury, or result in severe mal-
formation of the foetus.
Additionally, Section 3 of the CTOPA lists requirements that the health facility
needs to comply with in order to be authorised to provide abortions. This section states
that termination of a pregnancy may take place only at a facility which (a) gives access
to medical and nursing staff; (b) gives access to an operating theatre; (c) has appropri-
ate surgical equipment; (d) supplies drugs for intravenous and intramuscular injection;
(e) has emergency resuscitation equipment and access to an emergency referral centre
or facility; (f) gives access to appropriate transport should the need arise for emergency
transfer; (g) has facilities and equipment for clinical observation and access to in-
patient facilities; (h) has appropriate infection control measures; (i) gives access to safe
waste disposal infrastructure; (j) has telephonic means of communication; and (k) has
been approved by the Member of the Executive Council by notice in the Gazette.
The CTOPA was amended by Act No. 38 of 2004 and expanded the list of medical
personnel that can perform abortion. Termination of pregnancies of 12 weeks gestation
or less can be performed not only by a registered medical practitioner, but also by
a registered nurse or midwife who has completed the prescribed abortion training
course. Abortions in the second trimester (13–20 weeks) can only be performed by
a registered medical doctor.
The CTOPA does not allow for self-managed abortion. As we pointed above, the
CTOPA imposes a series of penalties to ‘[a]ny person’ who does not comply with the
provisions of the Act when providing an abortion. This – as noted by Pickles – has
been used to criminalise women who self-induce abortions.82
In terms of human rights standards, the WHO considers that restriction on the
range of providers or facilities that are authorised to provide abortion reduce the avail-
ability of services and their equitable geographic distribution.83 There is extensive evi-
dence mifepristone and misoprostol capsules can be self-administered to safely induce
a discrete and non-invasive medical abortion in pregnant women up to 12 weeks of
gestation.84 Research shows that self-managed abortion with pills is very effective, safe
and acceptable, reduces the visits to the clinic – hence the burden on women and serv-
ices – and does not require specific training or specialisation expanding the range of
personnel that can prescribe the drugs.85 Abortion after the 12th week entails a higher
81 The relevant section reads as follows: (i) the continued pregnancy would pose a risk of injury to the woman’s
physical or mental health; or (ii) there exists a substantial risk that the foetus would suffer from a severe physical
or mental abnormality; or (iii) the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest; or (iv) the continued pregnancy would
significantly affect the social or economic circumstances of the woman.
82 C Pickles Self-induced abortion in South Africa and Section 10 of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92
of 1996. (2017) South African Journal on Human Rights, 33(3), 496–506.
83 World Health Organization (note 64 above). para 4.2.2.4.
84 Perehudoff, Katrina, Lucıa Berro Pizzarossa, and Jelle Stekelenburg. ‘Realising the right to sexual and reproductive
health: access to essential medicines for medical abortion as a core obligation.’ BMC international health and
human rights18, no. 1 (2018): 8.
85 Thoa Ngoi D., Min Hae Park, Haleema Shakur, and Caroline Free. ‘Comparative effectiveness, safety and
acceptability of medical abortion at home and in a clinic: a systematic review.’ Bulletin of the World Health
Organization 89 (2011): 360–70.
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risk for the pregnant woman which grants the intervention of a trained professional
but does not justify the doctor(s) interference in women’s health care decisions that
will be discussed in Section 3.1.4.
These restrictions are – as it was stated above – a violation of the obligation of the
state to guarantee the right to SRH. GC 22 is very clear in this regard ‘[a]n adequate
number of functioning health care facilities, services, goods and programmes should be
available to provide the population with the fullest possible range of sexual and repro-
ductive health care’.86 Furthermore, the GC considers that ensuring the availability of
trained medical and professional personnel and skilled providers who are trained to
perform the full range of sexual and reproductive health care services is a critical com-
ponent of ensuring availability. In the same vein, the African Commission has noted
that states have the duty to remove restrictions that are not necessary for providing
safe abortion services such as the requirements of multiple signatures, approval by
committees before an abortion can be performed, or restricting performance of abor-
tion to only medical practitioners.87
The legal barriers mentioned above are exacerbated by the dire situation in terms of
effective availability and accessibility to abortion services – and health services more
generally. Despite the health care system reform and the efforts to invest in the public
sector, inequalities persist in terms of infrastructure and resources. Regarding the avail-
ability and accessibility to train medical personnel, nearly 83 per cent of the population
relies on the public health system, yet the private health care sector employs the major-
ity of health care professionals and spends nearly 6 times more per patient.88
In terms of the lack of sufficient health facilities, a recent report issued by
Amnesty International indicates that only about 260 of the country’s 3880 health facili-
ties provide abortions. This number is not surprising giving the extensive list of
requirements that facilities willing to provide these services need to meet and the high
number of conscientious objectors. Effectively, less than 7 per cent of all the medical
facilities in the country are able and/or willing to provide an essential life-saving med-
ical procedure.89
As mentioned above, these requirements aggravate the already existing inequalities
in society and once again it is poor, rural, young and black women that bear a dispro-
portionate burden of the lack of political will to realise the right to SRH. People living
in rural areas—that represent the 43.6 per cent of the population—often experience the
greatest adversities accessing quality health care.90 It is reported that the multiple con-
sultations that the process requires and the long distance that some women need to
travel to access the scarce available medical facilities can require up to 3,000 South
86 CESCR ‘General Comment No. 22’ (note 5 above) para 40.
87 African Commission ‘General Comment No. 2’ (note 45 above) para 58.
88 National Health Care Facilities ‘Baseline Audit National Summary Report’ (2013) <http://www.hst.org.za/sites/
default/files/NHFA_webready_0.pdf> Department of Health ‘Human Resources for Health South Africa’ (2011);
RSA Negotiated Service Delivery Agreement For Outcome Two: ‘A Long and Healthy Life for All South Africans’
2010 cited by Amnesty International and UCT Women’s Health Research Unit Briefing Barriers to Safe and Legal
Abortion in South Africa (2017) <https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/breifing_barriers_to_safe_and_legal_abortion_
in_south_africa_final_003.pdf>.
89 Ibid.
90 Amnesty International and UCT Women’s Health Research Unit Barriers to Safe and Legal Abortion in South Africa
(note 96 above).
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African rand (USD 240 approximately) and severely hamper access to safe abortion
(both medical and surgical).91 Amnesty International reports that rural women are
served by only 12 per cent of the country’s doctors and 19 per cent of nurses.92
In addition, second-trimester abortions account for over 20 per cent of abortions
performed in South Africa, which is greater than other countries with legalised abor-
tion.93 Delays due to inappropriate referrals evidenced by women attending numerous
facilities before obtaining an abortion, waiting periods of over two weeks and difficul-
ties locating a facility providing abortions are concerning and have been singled out as
factors contributing to this high rate.94 Concretely, women’s access to abortion care
services is being delayed by compromising their ability to access an earlier, less
risky procedure.
All these burdensome requirements – only specific medical personnel can provide
abortion services, the service may require the intervention of more than one medical
practitioner or midwife, only special facilities that fulfil the long list of requisites can
provide the service – force women to seek illegal and unsafe abortions. The existing
requirements violate the State’s obligation to fulfil the right to SRH that requires States
to take measures to eradicate practical barriers to the full realisation of the right to sex-
ual and reproductive health, such as disproportionate costs and lack of physical or geo-
graphical access to sexual and reproductive health care.95 Clearly, it also violates South
Africa’s obligation to prevent unsafe abortions.
3.1.3 Mandatory ultrasound
Additionally, the Bill proposed by the African Christian Democratic Party demanded the
addition of one more person (a social worker) to the process of termination of preg-
nancy. Furthermore, it requires that women undergo an ultrasound before an abortion
and state that health facilities can only provide abortion services if they have such equip-
ment. These additional requirements worsen the already burdensome process.
The requirement of a mandatory ultrasound would place even more restrictions in
the already small number of health facilities that can provide abortion and evidence
shows that it is not medically necessary and can add significantly to the cost of the
abortion procedure.96 The Guttmacher Institute considers that generally, such
a requirement ‘appears to be a veiled attempt to personify the foetus and dissuade
a woman from obtaining an abortion’.97 However, research on the effects of offering
voluntary ultrasound viewing on women’s experience with abortion provides evidence
91 J Harries, M Momberg, C Gerdts, D Greene Foster ‘An exploratory study of what happens to women who are
denied abortions in a legal setting in South Africa’ (2015) 15 BMC Reproductive Health 21.
92 Amnesty International and UCT Women’s Health Research Unit Barriers to Safe and Legal Abortion in South Africa
(note 96 above).
93 South African Department of Health ‘Termination of Pregnancy Update Cumulative Statistics through 2004’ (2005).
See also Grossman, Daniel, Deborah Constant, Naomi Lince, Marijke Alblas, Kelly Blanchard, and Jane Harries.
‘Surgical and medical second trimester abortion in South Africa: a cross-sectional study.’ BMC health services
research 11, no. 1 (2011): 224.
94 J Harries, P Orner, M Gabrie and E Mitchell ‘Delays in seeking an abortion until the second trimester: a qualitative
study in South Africa’ (2007) 4/1 Reproductive Health 7.
95 UN CESCR ‘General Comment No. 22’ (note 5 above) para. 46.
96 Guttmacher Institute ‘State policies in brief: requirements for ultrasound’ <http://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf>.
97 Guttmacher Institute ‘State policies in brief: requirements for ultrasound’ (note 90 above).
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that ultrasound viewing does not dissuade women from abortion.98 In summary, the
requirement of ultrasound in order to terminate a pregnancy does not have any deter-
rent effect; it only makes the procedure more costly in terms of money, decreases the
number of medical facilities that can provide the service.
This cannot be reconciled with the obligation of the state to remove all barriers
interfering with women’s access to comprehensive sexual and reproductive health serv-
ices, goods, education and information.99 By passing a law that adds these – and the
other requirements – the South African government would be failing in its obligation
to refrain from enacting laws and policies that create barriers in access to sexual and
reproductive services.100 GC 22 states that ‘the imposition of barriers to sexual and
reproductive health information, goods and services’ is an impermissible retrogres-
sive measure.101
3.1.4 Third party authorisation
Furthermore, if the woman is seeking a late-term abortion the CTOPA requires the
intervention of two doctors or a doctor and a midwife in order for them to ‘authorise’
the abortion if in their ‘opinion’ any of the three grounds is configured (Section 2 (I)
(c)). This is a form of third-party authorisation that women need to obtain prior to
accessing the service. The CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation 24 notes
that conditioning women’s access to health services on the authorisation of husbands,
partners, parents, or health authorities is a significant barrier to the pursuit of their
health goals, deterring people from seeking and receiving the information and services
guaranteed by law.102 The UN bodies have repeatedly called for the requirement’s elim-
ination and GC 22 explicitly requires its prohibition.103
The Bill proposed by the African Christian Democratic Party added one more per-
son (a social worker) that needs to authorise the termination of pregnancy for cases in
which the decision is based on social or economic reasons. According to the arguments
posed by the proponents of the Bill ‘a social worker’s expertise is [going to be] offered
before pregnancy is terminated for social or economic reasons’.104As argued above, the
introduction of another professional that needs to authorise the termination of the
pregnancy aggravates an already uphill battle. This additional requirement feeds into
the stereotype of women as irrational decision-makers incapable of making their own
decisions and is based on the harmful understanding that the state, the doctors and/or
the social workers know better than women do what they really want and need in mat-
ters of sexual and reproductive health and rights.105
98 UD Upadhyay, K Kimport, EK Belusa, NE Johns, DW Laube and SC Roberts ‘Evaluating the impact of a mandatory
pre-abortion ultrasound viewing law: A mixed methods study’ (2017) 12/7 PloS one.
99 UN CESCR ‘General Comment No. 22’ (note 5 above) paras 28 and 34.
100 Ibid para. 40.
101 Ibid para 38.
102 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ‘General Recommendation No. 24, Women
and Health’ (1999) UN Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1 para. 14.
103 Grover (note 21 above) para. 55; CEDAW Committee ‘Slovakia’ (note 76 above), para. 31; UN CESCR ‘General
Comment No. 22’ (note 5 above) paras 40–1.
104 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Bill (B34-2017) can be accessed <https://pmg.org.za/bill/
748/>.
105 RB Siegel ‘The New Politics of Abortion : An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions’ (2007)
1 Yale Law School, Faculty Scholarship Series 991.
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This requirement enables doctors to act as ‘gate-keepers’ – in the sense used by
Halliday – who control access to abortion and hold significant influence in determining
what medical treatments are required to accept during pregnancy/birth.106
The prerequisite is, in other words, contrary to the obligations set by both the
regional and international legal framework. Indeed, GC 22 states that violations of the
obligation to respect occur when states impose legal barriers that undermine the right
to SRH and states’ failure to take the measures necessary to eradicate such barriers are
seen as a violation of the right to fulfil.107 Equally, the African Commission urges states
to remove barriers that are not necessary to ensure access to safe abortion services.108
3.1.5 Conscientious objection
The CTOPA does not include any provision explicitly regulating the exercise of con-
scientious objection (CO) which is seen as one of the shortcomings of the frame-
work.109 Nonetheless, as Ngwena pointed out, Section 15 of the South African
Constitution of 1996, which inter-alia, guarantees the right to freedom of conscience,
implicitly accommodates the right to conscientious objection to abortion.110 This is not
an absolute right, but is subject to accommodating women’s constitutional rights and
international human rights.111
However, there are no clear guidelines to regulate the exercise of this right and this
hinders access to abortion services by reducing the number of medical personnel and
facilities that effectively provide these services.112 In fact, a qualitative study by the
WHO on abortion services in the Western Cape showed that ‘Providers’ reluctance to
be involved in different aspects of abortion provision led to complex and fragmented
levels of service provision in many healthcare facilities.’113
Even more problematic is the lack of clear conceptualisation on behalf of the State
and lack of understanding on behalf of the medical personnel of what constitutes con-
scientious objection. Conscientious objection is being used in an ‘ad hoc, unregulated
and at times incorrect’ manner as a means to oppose abortion on very broad grounds
– similar to the civil disobedience reported in Uruguay114 – resisting the application of
the law and the objection became an all-encompassing opportunity for non-participa-
tion in abortion services.115 Furthermore, the right to refuse to provide abortion serv-
ices applies only to the abortion procedure. Therefore, medical personnel that are not
106 S Halliday Autonomy and Pregnancy. A Comparative Analysis of Compelled Obstetric Intervention (2016) 172.
107 UN CESCR ‘General Comment No. 22’ (note 5 above) paras 57 and 63.
108 African Commission ‘General Comment No. 2’ (note 45 above) para 60.
109 C Ngwena C ‘Conscientious objection and legal abortion in South Africa: delineating the parameters’ (2003) 28/1
Journal for Juridical Science 1–8.
110 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No 108 of 1996.
111 C Ngwena ‘Decision T-388/2009. A Commentary on a decision of the Constitutional Court of Colombia from an
African Regional Perspective’ in T-388/2009: Conscientious Objection and Abortion, A Global Perspective on the
Colombian Experience (2014) <https://www.law.georgetown.edu/oneillinstitute/research/documents/WLWT-388-
09English-FINAL.pdf>.
112 J Harries, D Cooper, A Strebel, CJ Colvin ‘Conscientious objection and its impact on abortion service provision in
South Africa: A qualitative study’ (2014) 11/1 BMC Reproductive Health 16.
113 World Health Organization What health-care providers say on providing abortion care in Cape Town, South Africa:
findings from a qualitative study (2010) <http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/unsafe_abortion/
rhr_hrp_10_18/en/>.
114 See L Cabal, M Arango Olaya and V. Montoya Robledo ‘Striking a balance: Conscientious objection and
reproductive health care from the Colombian perspective’ (2014) 16/2 Health and Human Rights Journal 73–83.
115 Harries, Cooper & Strebel (note 124 above).
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directly involved with the abortion procedure cannot invoke conscientious objection as
a reason to deny assistance to a woman seeking abortion services.116 More importantly,
in terms of the constitutional right of all South Africans to emergency health care, con-
scientious objection cannot be used to refuse the provision of post-abortion and/or
emergency services related to induced or spontaneous abortions.117
As Fiala and Arthur highlight, reproductive health is the only field in medicine
where societies worldwide accept freedom of conscience as a valid argument to limit
a patient‘s right to a legal medical treatment.118 In practice, the (ab)use of conscien-
tious objection prevents patients from receiving accurate, scientific, and unbiased infor-
mation about their options, and thus inhibits their ability to access such care.119
The WHO states that health-care professionals who claim conscientious objection
must refer the woman to another willing and trained provider in the same, or another
easily accessible health-care facility. Where a referral is not possible, the health-care
professional who objects must provide safe abortion to save the woman’s life, to pre-
vent serious injury to her health and provide urgent care when women present with
complications from unsafe or illegal abortion.120
All in all, the South African lack of guidelines, monitoring and accountability mech-
anisms with regards to the exercise of CO clashes with the obligations assumed at the
international level. Firstly, the obligation to protect the right to SRH requires states to
prohibit and prevent private actors from imposing practical or procedural barriers to
health services.121 In this regard, states must organise health services in a manner that
ensures that ‘the exercise of conscientious objection by health professionals does not
prevent women from obtaining access to health services’.122 Secondly, the CEDAW
Committee clarified that ‘if health service providers refuse to perform such services
based on conscientious objection, measures should be introduced to ensure that
women are referred to alternative health providers’.123 According to GC 22, states must
appropriately regulate this practice to ensure that it does not inhibit anyone’s access to
SRH care, including by requiring referrals. Additionally, this referral must be done to
an accessible provider capable of and willing to provide the services being sought.124
And thirdly, states must guarantee access to abortion services in urgent or emergency
situations.125 The South African framework – or lack thereof – does not meet any of
these standards.
116 See Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan and Another [2014] UKSC 68; see also African Commission ‘General
Comment No. 2’ (note 45 above) para 26.
117 C Morroni, G Buga, L Myer ‘Understanding aspects of the termination of pregnancy legislation’ (2006) 24/1
Continuing Medical Education’ 37–8.
118 Fiala and Arthur (note 65 above) 13.
119 TA Weitz and S Berke Fogel ‘The denial of abortion care information, referrals, and services undermines quality
care for U.S. women’ (2010) 20 Women’s Health Issues 7–11.
120 World Health Organization (note 64 above) para 4.2.2.5.
121 UN CESCR ‘General Comment No. 22’ (note 5 above) paras 43 and 63.
122 UNGA ‘Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Practices in Adopting
a Human Rights-based Approach to Eliminate Preventable Maternal Mortality and Morbidity’ (2011) UN Doc. A/
HRC/18/27 para. 30.
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4. Conclusions and perspectives for the future
Policies and laws that act as barriers to the availability, accessibility, acceptability, and
quality of SRH remain a serious area of concern worldwide.126 In September 2016,
a group of experts from the UN reiterated that: ‘[r]estrictive legislation which denies
access to safe abortion is one of the most damaging ways of instrumentalising women’s
bodies and a grave violation of women’s human rights.’127
This article shows the urgent call for vigilance and modernisation that the CTOPA
and the proposed amendment elicit. There is no contention in terms of the inter-
national obligations assumed by the South African State: it must repeal or reform laws
that impede the exercise of SRH – including laws that criminalise or restrict access to
abortion services – and is required to remove and refrain from enacting laws and poli-
cies that create barriers in access to SRH services. As discussed above, a critical analysis
of the existing framework and the potentially upcoming law reforms is key to ensure
that the state complies with its obligations in the international sphere and effectively
ensures women’s access to abortion services.
This article reveals that – in spite of its acclaim at the international level and the
adoption of a praiseworthy law on abortion – South Africa has fallen short of adopting
a legal framework that complies with international standards and that guarantees
effective access to abortion services. Although more than 20 years have passed since
the enactment of the CTOPA, women still face serious barriers in access to lawful serv-
ices, endangering their health and lives.
The proposed amendment Bill analysed in this article was rejected by the
National Assembly in May 2018. It was stated that ‘[t]he Committee [National
Assembly Public Health Committee] was unanimous in the view that the Bill
was fatally flawed, not practical and would place huge financial burden on the
Department of Health, which was already under-staffed and faced financial
challenges – if the Bill was not implementable, there was no value in passing the
legislation’.128 The decision also indicated that ‘[f]rom a constitutional perspective,
the proposed Bill places an unnecessary heavy burden on those who wish to ter-
minate pregnancy’. 129
Although this represents a positive development that rejects the imposition of
extra barriers to access abortion services it is important that law-makers, as well
as health and human rights advocates, follow these kind of initiatives carefully in
order to keep compliance with the international human rights framework in mind.
Scholars report that anti-abortion activism has adopted a new so-called ‘women-
centred’ agenda that given their lack of success in outlawing abortion completely,
now support the imposition of burdensome barriers that effectively erode women’s
126 Cottingham et al. (note 8 above).
127 Statement by Alda Facio, Chair-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women
in law and in practice; Dainius Puras, UN Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; Juan E. Mendez, UN Special Rapporteur on torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and Dubravka Simonovic, UN Special
Rapporteur on violence against women; see OHCHR, ‘Unsafe abortion is still killing tens of thousands women
around the world – UN rights experts warn,’ (28 September 28 2016) <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID¼20600&LangID¼E>.
128 Republic of South Africa, National Assembly Portfolio Committee on Health, Session 09 May 2018. pmg.org.za.
129 Republic of South Africa, National Assembly Portfolio Committee on Health, Session 09 May 2018. pmg.org.za.
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access to the legally recognised right.130 Indeed, the draft Bill fits a pattern
observed by the literature in which those opposing abortions use the tactic to
introduce several burdensome requirements in order to ‘protect’ or ‘empower’
women.131 A shift has been noted in the South African context from a direct
attack on the core right to abortion to attempts to narrow the ambit of women’s
reproductive choice.132 States parties should be guided by contemporary human
rights instruments and jurisprudence, as well as the most up-to-date international
guidelines and protocols established by the UN agencies and must remain vigilant
of initiatives that undermine women’s right to sexual and reproductive rights.
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